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Professional teams are often taken to increase their home city’s visibility among 
tourists. As teams get extensive media coverage, their home cities make the news, 
and this is thought to turn anonymous places into potential tourism destinations. 
Such potential benefits are often behind sports teams’ demands for public 
subsidies. Yet, so far no analysis has shown that the increased visibility generated 
by a team brings more visitors into town. 
Estimating the effect of team visibility on the attractiveness of a city as a 
destination is difficult, as both the location of teams and their decision to move 
are likely to be related to some of the factors that also make cities attractive to 
tourists (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). I present the first evidence of a positive 
causal effect of team visibility on city travel by exploiting the random draw of the 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League soccer 
tournament, a European competition that takes place once a year. My 
identification strategy exploits a lottery that randomly allocates teams (and their 
cities) to different groups of the competition. This creates a unique “natural 
experiment” in which treatment is assigned to connections across entire cities.  
In the first phase of the tournament, participating teams are randomly divided 
into groups of 4, and have to play a 3-months round-robin tournament with the 
teams of their group. During this phase, the teams – and their home cities – are 
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likely to get more mention in cities hosting group rivals, and the visibility of a city 
should therefore increase more in cities hosting teams in the same group than in 
other Champions League cities. As the groups are formed randomly, this setup 
allows to compare air travel between cities hosting teams in the same group 
(treated routes), to air travel between Champions League cities hosting teams 
assigned to different groups (control routes). The control routes represent a valid 
counterfactual for treated routes because the teams in these cities could have met, 
and did not by pure chance. 
The group phase of the UEFA Champions League ends in early December and 
is followed by a break in the competition that lasts until early March. Looking at 
monthly data of intra European flights, I find that over the months from January 
to March cities hosting rivals in the group phase see an increase in monthly air 
traffic of 5 to 8 percentage points relative to routes across cities whose teams 
played in different groups. At the mean, this effect implies that between January 
and March around 2700 more people travel on treated routes. The effect fades 
away as the tournament proceeds to its final phase, and teams that were initially 
assigned to the same group no longer play against each other. Interestingly, I find 
a larger effect in cities that have a team which takes part in the Champions’ 
League for the first time. Although the small number of such cities makes precise 
statements difficult, the result provides suggestive evidence that the group phase 
treatment has diminishing returns. 
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The UEFA Champions League brings enormous media attention to the 32 
participating soccer teams. Football is by far the most popular sport in Europe, 
and the UEFA Champions League is the major continental competition for 
European soccer teams. The competition is covered widely by national and local 
media, and the games are watched by millions of people across the continent. 
Participating clubs do not play any other continental competition during the 
season, and Champions League games are never played on days when domestic 
league or other continental competitions take place, which means that no other 
game competes for attention. The first phase of the tournament takes place during 
fall and lasts for around three months. During this phase participating teams are 
randomly divided into groups of 4 and teams in the same group play against each 
other twice.  
My estimation strategy exploits the random formation of these groups and 
compares city travel between cities hosting teams in the same group with city 
travel between cities hosting teams in different groups. The advantage of this 
approach is that it eliminates the effect of participation in the UEFA Champions 
League, which is unlikely to be random. In effect, the approach allows to run a 
unique experiment where entire cities are either treated or control units. 
Although the formation of groups is inherently random, I find that treated routes 
tend to be busier 9 to 3 months before the group phase starts (Figure 1). I clean 
the residual heterogeneity across treated and control routes by estimating all 
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regressions with route fixed effects. Figure 2 shows that air traffic has identical 
distribution across treated and control routes once route fixed effects are 
accounted for. I show the robustness of my results to the inclusion of city-specific 
polynomial in time as well as several alternative methods of inference. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. 
Section III explains the identification strategy and presents the data. Section IV 
shows that observable variables are balanced across treated and control routes. 
Section V presents the main results and section VI proves their robustness. 







FIGURE 1. ARRIVALS IN JANUARY-JUNE ON ROUTES ACROSS CITIES TAKING PART TO THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE GROUP PHASE 
IN THE FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER (1998-2010) 
Notes: There is one observation per route: number of arrivals is the average on the 2 directions. Treated routes have 
their team playing in the same group from September to December, control routes are routes across cities that could have 
met but eventually had their teams playing in different groups. Arrivals are observed in January-June before the Group 
phase takes place. I exclude all routes that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw 





FIGURE 2. RESIDUALIZED ARRIVALS IN JANUARY-JUNE ON ROUTES ACROSS CITIES TAKING PART TO THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE 
GROUP PHASE IN THE FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER (1998-2010) 
Notes: There is one observation per route, number of arrivals is the average on the 2 directions. Treated routes have 
their team playing in the same group from September to December, control routes are routes across cities that could have 
met but eventually had their teams playing in different groups. Arrivals are observed in January-June before the Group 
phase takes place. The figure plots the distribution of residuals from a regression on route fixed effects. I exclude all routes 
that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw and (ii) connect cities in Israel, Russia, 







II. Related Literature 
This paper relates to a growing literature studying the impact of professional 
sports on tourism. Analysis of rate and occupancy of hotel rooms in the days 
around major sports event find generally positive effects on the day of the event 
but little anticipation (cf. the study of hotels in Charlotte, NC: Depken and 
Stephenson, 2018). The effects after the event are small and sometimes negative 
(as after winter games in Lapland: Falk and Vieru, 2020). Chikish et al. (2019) 
use NHL and NBA unexpected lockouts as natural experiments to study the effect 
of sports matches on hotel occupancy around a large sports arena in L.A. Their 
results indicate that these stoppages had if anything a positive effect on the hotels 
in the area. Similar results were found for Canadian cities by Lavoie and 
Rodrigues (2005).1 
The presence of professional sport teams may affect income, wages and 
employment of local communities (Baade, 1996; Coates and Humphreys, 2003; 
Coates, 2007; Islam, 2017). Over the long run, direct and indirect effects will be 
incorporated in real estate prices, and Carlino and Coulson (2004) document 
higher house rents in cities with NFL franchises.2 Coates and Humphreys (2006) 
show that, when asked to vote on the public funding of a new stadium, people 
 
1 A related literature has looked at tourists’ expenditure during sports events: cf. Rudkin and Sharma (2018) for English 
Premier League games and Salgado-Barandela, Barajas and Sánchez-Fernández (2019) for the “sport portfolio” of a small 
town hosting several relatively medium-sized events. 
2 Similarly, Propheter (2017) estimates higher rents in Brooklyn areas closer to the Barclays Sport Center. 
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living in areas closer to the proposed site of the facility support the project more 
than people living farther away, suggesting a positive view of such projects by 
people directly affected. Some of the positive economic effects have been 
challenged (cf. Coates, Humphreys and Zimbalist, 2006) and the conventional 
wisdom is that sports franchises have at best a small effect on city growth. 
The paper also speaks to the literature that has looked at the effect of “mega-
events” such as the World Cup or Olympic Games. Fourie and Santana-Gallego 
(2011) find a positive effect for several (but not all) mega-events on tourist 
arrivals. More recently Baumann and Matheson (2018) document large increase 
in air travelers to Brazil during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, but argue that the 
effect is driven by the arrival of fans from one particular country which did good 
in that event (Argentina). Rose and Spiegel (2011) identify a positive and 
permanent effect of hosting Summer Olympics on the exports of a country, 
though their results have been challenged by Maennig and Richter (2012). 
Overall, the conclusions of this academic literature suggest that direct and indirect 
financial benefits do not justify the cost of organizing such events.3 
Relative to previous work, this paper makes the following contributions. First, it 
introduces a new, credible identification to estimate the causal effect of media 
exposure associated with a large sport competition. Second, it documents a 
 
3 In a similar vein, Baumann, Matheson and Muroi (2009) and Baumann and Matheson (2017) look at air arrivals to 




persistent effect of sports events on air travel. Because I find persistence during 
months when the competition does not take place, the effect is likely to be a result 
of increased visibility from the Champions’ League, not the air travel directly 
related to the competition.  
III. Identification and Data 
A. Identification and Sample 
If a team increases the visibility of its home town, then we should observe 
visitors travel to the city after the club appears on high-profile international 
games. Moreover, the greatest number of visitors should come from cities where 
rival teams reside, and where the matches are arguably more salient. 
The Champions League is the most important showcase for European football 
teams, and the group phase of the competition offers the opportunity to be under 
the spotlight repeatedly over a period of three months. If the visibility effect is 
greater in the cities where opposing teams reside, it is possible to test its existence 
by regressing visitor arrivals from city j to city i in month m (Vij,m) on an indicator 
of whether the two cities had their team matched in the previous group phase of 





In equation (1) β1 is identified consistently because, within the population of all 
routes across cities with at least 1 team in the Champions League, Gij is randomly 
assigned. Notice that even observing Vij,m with no error, equation (1) is a 
conservative test for the visibility effect, because taking part to the Champions 
League is likely to increase the visibility of a city in all participating cities, 
regardless of the group in which they play. Since equation (1) compares visitors 
from cities with a team in the same group to visitors from cities with teams in 
different groups, it tests for the presence of an effect of being in the same group 
on top of the simple effect of taking part in the same edition of the Champions 
League. 
Before discussing the data, it is useful to explain the format and timing of the 
Champions League. As of the 2012-13 edition, the group phase was played by 32 
European teams divided in 8 groups of 4 teams each. Access to the group phase is 
reserved to the teams that performed best in their respective national leagues 
during the previous season. Once admitted to the group phase, every team is 
seeded into one of four pots according to its international standing: the eight 
strongest teams are seeded into pot number 1, the next eight teams into pot 
number 2, and so on. After seeding, each of the 8 groups is made of exactly one 
team randomly drawn from every pot, with the only provision that teams from the 
same Football Federation should not play in the same group. The random draw is 
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performed publicly in front of the press at the end of August. Once the groups are 
formed, between September and December each club has to play twice against 
each of the other 3 teams in its group: once at home and once as visitor.  
Games are always played on Tuesday or Wednesday, and they are broadcasted 
live on national televisions in prime time. These matches, and the media attention 
that they create in the two cities where they take place, is my treatment. Since 
teams assigned to different groups have no occasion to play against each other 
between September and December, and since only one group phase match was 
forfeited in the years I consider, compliance is always perfect.4 After the 
conclusion of the group phase in early December, the first two teams of every 
group advance to the final phase: this has the knock-out format and proceeds from 
the round of sixteen in March to the final in May.5 
The rules of the random draw imply that not all routes across Champions 
League cities are valid controls for treated routes. Teams in the same pot and 
teams from the same country never play in the same group: since routes across the 
cities of these teams could not have been treated, I exclude them throughout. 
Teams that have been seeded in the same pot tend to be of similar strength, and so 
this approach makes sure that routes across cities with two very strong (or two 
 
4 The forfeited match is A.S. Roma versus Dynamo Kyiv F.C., that was scheduled for the 15th of September 2004. For 
reasons discussed shortly, I exclude all routes that connect cities in Ukraine, and for this reason this observation is never 
part of the sample analyzed. 
5 The interested reader may refer to appendix C for additional details on the structure and history of the competition. 
14 
 
very weak) teams are not over represented in the control group. Since the strength 
of a team might be correlated with the economic performance of its home town, 
excluding these routes makes sure that results are not biased by the different 
composition of treated and control groups. On the other hand, teams coming from 
the same country never play in the same group in the Champions League, but 
have to play against each other in their national league. Since also these national 
games have the potential to increase the visibility of a city, dropping these routes 
makes sure that results are not biased downward by the inclusion of these routes 
among the controls. 
In addition to these exclusions, I always omit treated and control routes to and 
from UEFA countries that require a passport and/or a visa to enter (these are: 
Israel, Serbia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine). I do so because travel to these 
countries requires significantly more time and effort than travel within the 
Schengen Area, and these costs are likely to offset any boost coming from the 
Champions League. Although randomization was performed using teams from 
these countries too, between 1998-99 and 2010-11 only 13 percent of participants 
came from these nations, and their exclusion makes no difference in terms of 
balance of the remaining treated and control routes. Inclusion of these routes has 
two consequences on the results shown later. First, the distribution of variables 
across treatment and control routes is more balanced when these routes are 
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included. Second, coefficients from all regressions are less precise and somewhat 
smaller (but still significant). 
B. Data 
High frequency data on city-to-city number of visitors is scarce, and Vij,m in 
equation (1) can be observed only imperfectly. I proxy Vij,m, the number of 
visitors from city j to city i in month m, with (the logarithm of) Pij,m, the number 
of arrivals from all airports serving city j to all airports serving city i in month m. 
These data are available from Eurostat at monthly frequency since 1998, so I will 
focus on all Champions League editions between the 1998-99 and the 2010-11. 
Data on all Champions League games comes from the UEFA official website. See 
appendix A for further details. 
Studying the visibility effect on air traffic alone would not be a limitation if 
visitors traveling with other modes of transport are affected in similar ways. In 
practice, the relative importance of different modes of transport depends on the 
relative position of two cities, so that the visibility effect is likely to have 
heterogeneous effects across different routes and modes of transport. Random 
assignment implies that estimated coefficients are consistent estimates of the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of the Champions League on air traffic. Since 
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most Europeans travel abroad by plane, this is a relevant effect to estimate.6 
Moreover, if we were willing to assume that on average the Champions League 
effect is the same for other modes of transport, then the estimated coefficient 
would be a consistent estimate of the proportional effect of the Champions 
League on overall travel.7 
One final reason to consider results with air travel as a lower bound is the 
following. Not all routes have equal capacity, and affected visitors might find it 
convenient to fly across airports that do not serve directly the cities in the 
Champions League (for instance, tourists going to Turin may land in the larger 
airport of Milan for convenience). Since I only look at the airports directly serving 
cities with teams in the Champions League, and do not control for potential 
stopovers or airports in nearby cities, my estimates would be biased downward if 
the effect spills over to routes that are classified as controls, or if some of the 
effect travels on routes that I do not consider. 
 
6 Among the countries considered, across any pair of countries for which both air and train traffic is available, there was 
a median of 11.2 air travelers for every passenger arriving by train between 2004 and 2010. For countries that are 
connected via sea, the median ratio of air to boat arrivals over the same period was 2.9. There are no similar statistics on 
intra European road traffic, but given that within the countries considered the median ratio of passenger-Km transported by 
car (by coach) to those transported by train is 11.2 (1.6), air traffic is likely to be at least as important as car travel, and 
several times more relevant than either train, coach or boat. Notice moreover that these numbers are likely to be lower 
bounds of the relevance of air traffic within Europe, because they are computed only for country pairs for which a direct 
connection is active (either by train or via sea). For several country pairs in the sample no such link exists, and on many 
routes airplanes are simply the only practical mode of transport available. 
7 In order to estimate the ATE of the Champions League on the overall number of travelers one would still need to 
multiply the estimated proportional change by the average overall travel across all routes in the sample. Since city-level 




This section documents the balance between treated and control pairs. The first 
line of Table 1 shows that the baseline value of the variable of interest is not 
balanced across treated and control routes before treatment is assigned. Average 
arrivals between January and June are 0.21 log points greater on routes that will 
be treated the following September (p-value = 0.016). Figure 1 shows that also the 
distribution of this variable is different across treated and controls (the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of identical distributions at the 0.1 
percent level). Since between January and June most participants of the 
Champions League edition that starts in September are still to be decided, these 
tests suggest that treated routes tend to be busier than control routes always.  
Although the formation of groups is inherently random, cities that send their 
teams more often to the Champions League are more likely to have their teams 
matched together, and at the same time might be richer and have busier routes. In 
general, if unobservable characteristics of two cities affect both the average air 
traffic and the likelihood of their teams to meet during the group phase of the 
Champions League, the estimates of the Champions League effect will be 
inconsistent. This is especially true when the dependent variable is air arrivals, 
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because air traffic is extremely persistent,8 and in these cases Bruhn and 
McKenzie (2009) insist that consistency of estimates is warranted only when also 
the baseline value of the outcome of interest is balanced across treated and 
controls. 
I address the heterogeneity in the baseline value of air arrivals across treated 
and controls by exploiting the panel structure of my data. In Figure 2 I plot the 
distributions of the residuals of a regression of air arrivals between January and 
June before the group phase on route fixed effects (FE). The figure shows that the 
distribution of these residuals in treated routes is very similar to the distribution in 
control routes. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests can not reject the null of identical 
distributions (p-value = 0.194). Even though the test has low power (Kim and 
Whitt, 2015), both its result and visual inspection of Figure 2 provide initial 
support to the identification strategy, as they suggest that the inclusion of route FE 
make treated and control routes comparable. A more robust test is a comparison 
of average arrivals in the months before treatment conditional on route fixed 
effects: row 3 on Table 1 reports this test, which fails to reject the null of no 
difference (p-value = 0.761). 
The rest of Table 1 shows that treated and control pairs are balanced also with 
respect to other observable characteristics. Because the units of observation are 
 




pairs of cities, I use dyadic regressions (cf. Fafchamps and Gruber 2007a): I 
check the balance of treated and control routes with respect to both the average 
and the absolute difference of the variables of the two cities on a route. The 
intuition is that both the levels and the difference of these variables may correlate 




TABLE 1— BALANCE OF TREATED AND CONTROL ROUTES. 
    Observations Mean
Variable  Treated Control Treated Control p-value   (T=C) 
PANEL A – Dependent variable (log P) 
Arrivals (January-June before group phase, logs)
Average  162 1061 11.11 10.9 0.016** 
Absolute difference  162 1061 6.6 6.36 0.008*** 
    
Route FE regression residuals (January-June before group phase, logs)
Average  162 1061 0.01 0.00 0.761 
Absolute difference  162 1061 0.01 0.00 0.696 
   
Change in arrivals (January-June before group phase, logs)
Average  137 933 6.80% 4.40% 0.230 
Absolute difference   137 933 10.30% 2.50% 0.081* 
   
PANEL B – Selection 
Routes with non missing air-traffic (September-December)
    3544 23312 15.60% 14.90% 0.248 
   
PANEL C - Tourism 
Touristic nights by residents (year of the match, logs)
Average  112 720 15.73 15.66 0.286 
Absolute difference  112 720 1.26 1.29 0.746 
   
Touristic nights by residents (1 year before the match, logs)
Average  109 703 15.7 15.63 0.351 
Absolute difference  109 703 1.28 1.3 0.809 
   
Change in touristic nights by residents (year of the match)
Average  109 703 2.50% 2.20% 0.658 
Absolute difference  109 703 9.90% 10.00% 0.964 
   
Touristic nights by non residents (year of the match, logs)
Average  112 720 15.89 15.85 0.621 
Absolute difference  112 720 1.44 1.52 0.465 
   
Touristic nights by non residents (1 year before the match, logs)
Average  109 703 15.84 15.81 0.586 
Absolute difference  109 703 1.41 1.53 0.311 
   
Change in touristic nights by non residents (year of the match)
Average  109 703 4.20% 3.70% 0.537 
Absolute difference   109 703 6.50% 7.60% 0.138 
Notes: The sample include all treated and control routes for which information on reported variable is available 
but excludes all routes to and from Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Source: Author calculations. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 1(CONTINUED) — BALANCE OF TREATED AND CONTROL ROUTES. 
    Observations Mean  
Variable  Treated Control Treated Control  p-value   (T=C) 
PANEL D – Economy 
Income per capita (year of the match, logs) 
Average  8 49 9.8 9.77 0.577 
Absolute difference  8 49 0.28 0.28 0.887 
   
Income per capita (3 years before the match, logs)
Average  17 105 9.81 9.78 0.630 
Absolute difference  17 105 0.36 0.41 0.454 
   
Income per capita growth (during the match)
Average  5 33 1.80% 0.40% 0.548 
Absolute difference  5 33 10.20% 13.10% 0.436 
   
Unemployment rate (year of the match) 
Average  54 294 9.10% 8.90% 0.636 
Absolute difference  54 294 5.20% 4.30% 0.135 
   
Unemployment rate (3 years before the match)
Average  69 387 8.60% 8.30% 0.485 
Absolute difference  69 387 4.80% 4.40% 0.434 
   
Change in unemployment rate (year of the match)
Average  35 190 1.10% 0.60% 0.323 
Absolute difference   35 190 5.50% 4.20% 0.106 
   
PANEL E - Geography 
Distance (logs)   113 668 6.76 6.76 1.000 
   
Cities are capital  
Both  139 860 18.00% 17.20% 0.823 
Only 1  139 860 50.40% 46.50% 0.399 
   
Cities are on an island (e.g. Great Britain, Cyprus)
Both  139 860 0.00% 0.50% 0.421 
Only 1  139 860 29.50% 31.40% 0.654 
   
Cities are in a landlocked country 
Both  139 860 0.00% 0.10% 0.688 
Only 1  139 860 10.10% 10.00% 0.979 
   
Cities are in a Mediterranean country 
Both  139 860 14.40% 11.30% 0.290 
Only 1   139 860 48.20% 47.60% 0.888 
Notes: The sample include all treated and control routes for which information on reported variable is available 
but excludes all routes to and from Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Source: Author calculations. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




TABLE 1(CONTINUED) — BALANCE OF TREATED AND CONTROL ROUTES. 
    Observations Mean
Variable   Treat. Control Treat. Control 
p-value   
(T=C) 
PANEL F – Demography
Population (year of the game, logs) 
Average  95 525 14.11 14.07 0.546 
Absolute difference  95 525 1.33 1.33 0.993 
   
Population (3 year before the game, logs) 
Average  91 530 14.1 14.06 0.629 
Absolute difference  91 530 1.49 1.43 0.643 
   
Population growth (year of the match) 
Average  75 426 1.70% 2.00% 0.292 
Absolute difference  75 426 3.80% 3.50% 0.516 
   
Percent population aged 20 to 35 (year of the match)
Average  81 475 23.40% 23.30% 0.706 
Absolute difference  81 475 4.10% 4.70% 0.116 
   
Percent population aged 20 to 35 (3 years before the match)
Average  63 358 23.20% 23.30% 0.701 
Absolute difference  63 358 3.80% 4.00% 0.538 
   
Change in percent population aged 20 to 35 (year of the match)
Average  46 269 -0.70% -0.70% 0.976 
Absolute difference  46 269 1.30% 1.40% 0.577 
   
Percent non national, EU residents (year of the match)
Average  40 205 4.60% 4.40% 0.603 
Absolute difference  40 205 5.70% 5.30% 0.644 
   
Percent non national, EU residents (3 years before the match)
Average  45 225 4.00% 3.60% 0.371 
Absolute difference  45 225 5.00% 4.60% 0.636 
   
Change in percent non national, EU residents (year of the match)
Average  28 153 0.90% 0.70% 0.313 
Absolute difference  28 153 1.00% 0.70% 0.063* 
   
Cities speak a romance language (e.g. Italian, Spanish,...)
Both  139 860 31.70% 26.20% 0.176 
Only 1  139 860 41.70% 41.50% 0.962 
   
Cities speak a germanic language (e.g. German, English,...)
Both  139 860 11.50% 15.30% 0.237 
Only 1   139 860 51.80% 43.30% 0.060* 
Notes: The sample include all treated and control routes for which information on reported variable is available 
but excludes all routes to and from Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
Source: Author calculations. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




Panel B of Table 1 shows that out of all the routes across cities that could have 
met but did not, 14.9 percent have non missing air data for both ways of the route 
during the months of the group phase. This number is similar to the proportion of 
routes across cities that had two teams playing in the same group (p-value = 
0.248) and suggests that not observing all air routes is not a source of concern. 
Panel C of Table 1 looks at tourism in the regions of the cities of the two teams, 
and it shows that tourist nights spent by residents and non-residents in the two 
years leading to the treatment do not differ systematically between treated and 
controls. Panel D looks at economic variables (income and unemployment) and 
Panel E looks at geography (distance between cities, capital status and location: 
on an island or landlocked): none of these variables are significantly different 
between treated and control routes. Finally, Panel F of Table 1 turns to 
demographics: population, share of people 20-35 years old, non-national EU 
residents and language: treated routes are only more likely to have one city 
speaking a Germanic language (p-value = 0.060). 
The tests in Table 1 show a strong balance between treated and control routes. 
Out of 60 tests, three are significant at the 10 percent level and only one at the 5 
percent level: less than the nominal probability of these tests. A joint test that 
allows correlation across these variables cannot reject the null of identical means: 
when I standardize all variables and run a single regression on the treatment 
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dummy, the coefficient of this dummy is not significant (p-value = 0.284). Since 
in this stacked regression I use standard errors clustered at the route-year level, 
this procedure tests for significant differences across treatment and control routes 
while allowing errors of different variables to be correlated within a single route-
year.9 Taken together, these results confirm that treatment is randomly assigned 
with respect to both time invariant and time varying characteristics, and that also 
pre trends do not differ significantly across treated and control routes.  
V. Results 
A. Event-Study Analysis 
I start by documenting the effect of being drawn into the same Champions’ 




























Where I regress the log number of passengers travelling from city i to city j in 
month m on Gij,m: a dummy equal to 1 if in that month teams from the two cities 
play a game of the group phase of the Champions’ League. I include 6 leads and 
 
9 Estimation of 60 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) is not feasible in this context because the covariance matrix of 
errors is singular. 
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12 lags of this dummy (Gij,m–l: l = –6,...,+12) to study the dynamics.10 The 
regression controls for route-month fixed effects (αij), year fixed effects (δt), and 
time trends specific to each month (μm × t) and country of origin and destination 
(∑c (ci + cj) × t and ∑c (ci - cj) × t).11 
Figure 3 plots γl from Equation (2). Conditional on route-month fixed effects 
treatment is as good as random: thus, all γl have causal interpretation. Figure 3 
suggests three conclusions. First, on average, each Champions’ League match 
increases city-to-city monthly air travel by 7.5 percentage points (p-value < 
0.000). The shock is sizable: on a monthly average of 16545 arrivals, this equals 
1238 passengers more for every match, 0.06 standard deviations or almost 7 full 
Airbus A320. Many of these extra arrivals are likely to be fans following their 
teams in the away matches: this first result confirms the importance of the group-
phase match as a shock to city-to-city air travel. 
Second, the spike is exactly on the month of the match, and all coefficients 
before the match are not significantly different from 0, neither alone nor jointly (F 
= 1.26; p-value = 0.271). This confirms the absence of pre-trends and supports the 
identification strategy. 
 
10 The number of leads and lags spans half a year before and one year after the event. Figures similar to Figure 3 can be 
produced with any number of leads and lags. Standard errors are clustered at the route-year-month level. See Section VI.B 
for a discussion of robust inference. 
11 Equation (2) is a directional dyadic regression (because log Pij,m ≠ log Pji,m). I follow Fafchamps and Gruber (2007b) 
and impose that the effect of countries trends on air travel be symmetric. I do this with ∑c ϕc (ci + cj) × t and ∑c ψc (ci - cj) × 
t. To see how this works, take all arrivals to and from Italy (ci = ITi): for this country, ϕIT captures the average trend of 
passengers to and from all Italian airports in the sample, while  ψIT picks the average trend of passengers for routes whose 
origin is in Italy. Symmetry requires that the average trend of passengers for routes that have destination in Italy be equal 




FIGURE 3. THE EFFECT ON THE MONTH OF THE MATCH 
Notes: The figure plots estimates of γl from regression (2) (l = –6,–5,…,+12). These coefficients represent the 
proportional difference in arrivals from city j to city i on treated routes relative to control routes. The coefficient in m (γ0) is 
the effect on the month in which a group phase match is played. The figure also plots effects 6 months before the game (m–
6) until 12 months after it (m+12). 95 percent confidence intervals calculated using standard errors clustered at the route-
month-year level are reported around the estimates. The number of observations is 17922: these are all routes across cities 
that had at least 1 team taking part in the Champions’ League group phase either in the current or in the previous year, but 
excludes routes that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw; (ii) connect cities in 
Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey or Ukraine and (iii) had their teams met in the later stages of the competition either in the 
current or in the previous edition of the Champions’ League. The dependent variable (log Pij,m) has the top and bottom 0.5 
percent of observations winsorized. Additional controls are year fixed effects, and trends specific to every month and to 




Third, Figure 3 suggests that treated routes stay relatively busier during the 
months following the game. A joint test of the first 8 lags of Gij m-l rejects the null 
of no effect (F = 3.09; p-value = 0.002), but only the fourth lag is individually 
significant at the 5 percent level. Because the two group-phase matches are played 
in any of the last four months of the year, it is possible that the event-study 
analysis does not pick up the effect on specific months precisely. Moreover, the 
event-study treats these two matches as two separate events, while the “treatment” 
that matters is likely to be the whole group phase. In the next section I explore 
this possibility with separate regressions for every month. 
B. The Effect after the Group Phase 
In order to test more carefully the hypothesis that air travel increases more on 
treated routes after the group phase ends, I focus on one month at a time, and for 
every month between the end of the group phase and start of following edition I 





















where Gij = 1 if the teams from the two cities played in the same group in the last 
edition of the Champions League and the meaning of other symbols is the same as 
in regression (2). Consistency of β is warranted by random assignment of Gij and 
the inclusion of route fixed effects αij. 
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TABLE 2 — EFFECT OF PLAYING IN THE SAME GROUP OF THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE DURING THE FOLLOWING MONTHS. 
 
β s.e. Obs. 
Route 
FE 
Year FE & 
country trends 
Month FE & 
month trends 
Month of the match a 0.067*** (0.016) 6136 Yes Yes Yes 
       
January 0.084** (0.035) 1344 Yes Yes No 
February 0.064** (0.032) 1346 Yes Yes No 
March b 0.062** (0.028) 1340 Yes Yes No 
April b 0.045 (0.030) 1358 Yes Yes No 
May b 0.042 (0.030) 1354 Yes Yes No 
June 0.030 (0.023) 1584 Yes Yes No 
July 0.033 (0.024) 1584 Yes Yes No 
August 0.019 (0.025) 1584 Yes Yes No 
 Notes: The table reports estimates of β in equation (3). The sample includes all routes across cities that had at 
least 1 team taking part in the Champions League group phase during the current edition. I exclude all routes 
that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw; (ii) connect cities in Israel, 
Russia, Serbia, Turkey or Ukraine and (iii) had their teams met in the later stages of the competition either in 
the current or in the previous edition of the Champions’ League. The dependent variable (log Pij,m) has the top 
and bottom 0.5 percent of observations winsorized. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the route-
month-year level. See text for details.  
Source: Author calculations. 
a September through December. b Knock-out phase. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Since the format of the competition has changed over the years I consider, and 
since the likelihood of teams to access the group phase evolves overtime 
according to the UEFA ranking of their home country, both year and country 
trends could be correlated with the likelihood that a specific team accesses the 
group phase (see Appendix C for a discussion of how country rankings affect the 
likelihood of accessing the group phase, and how UEFA computes them). In 
practice neither years nor country trends are correlated with the treatment: in a 
regression of Gij on route-fixed effects, years fixed effects and country trends, it is 
not possible to reject the null of joint insignificance of year fixed effects and 
country trends (F = 0.55; p-value = 0.979). I include these controls to improve 
precision: point estimates of β are barely affected when only route fixed effects 
(αij) are included.  
Table 2 shows estimates of (3) for the month of the match and for all months 
from January through August. In all regressions standard errors are clustered at 
the route-month-year level.12 The sample consists of all international routes across 
cities that could have met in the Champions League group phase between the 
1998-99 and 2010-11 editions but it excludes routes across cities that have their 
teams playing a match during the Champions League knock-out stage either that 
year or the year before. I exclude these routes because knock-out phase matches 
are a bigger shock to air traffic than group phase matches and teams playing in the 
 
12 Section VI.B discusses clustering and alternative inference methods. 
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same group are less likely to meet again at later stages: as a result, inclusion of 
these routes biases estimates downwards.13 
Table 2 indicates that playing in the same group of the Champions League 
increases air travel both on the month of the match (row 1) and in the first three 
months following the end of the group phase. The effect in January equals 0.08 
standard deviations in passenger arrivals in that month; the effects in both 
February and March equal 0.06 standard deviations of arrivals in these two 
months. The effect is smaller and not significant by April, when the knock-out 
phase reaches its most important games (quarter of finals and semi finals), and it 
disappears before the start of the new season in September. The effect is also 
economically relevant: in the first 3 months of the year, the estimates imply 996 
more passengers in January, 775 in February and 921 in March at the mean 
number of arrivals for these three months (11794, 12089 and 14798 respectively). 
Overall, two 90-minutes matches played during the fall attract 2692 visitors 
during the first three months of the year: 7 percent of average traffic in this 
period. 
Notice that the positive effects shown in the three months after the end of the 
group phase is not confounded by other matches played during the same period: 
 
13 The probability to meet a team from the same group is 0 for the round of sixteen, and very low afterwards. Excluding 
routes across cities that met in the knock-out phase one year before avoids that mean reversion 12 months after the event 
results in downward bias of the β, because meeting in a knock-out phase in a year is correlated with the probability of 
ending in the same group the year after. Inclusion of these routes drives estimates downward and worsens precision, but is 




the last group phase game is played on the first week of December, and I exclude 
all routes across cities that played a knock-out phase match during the spring. 
Moreover, teams are not allowed to take part in more than one international 
competition a year, and once they compete in the Champions’ League group 
phase they have no opportunity to meet until the next season (unless they advance 
in the Champions League and are pitched in a knock-out game, in which case they 
are dropped from my sample). 
C. The First Appearance of a Team 
Many teams play in the Champions’ League every year. While repeated 
exposure may increase the visibility of their cities, the effect may have 
diminishing returns. I explore this possibility by examining the differential effect 
of taking part in the Champions’ League for the first time.14 In all, 56 teams made 
their first appearance during the period of study: 13.5 percent of the 416 teams 
who took part in these editions. I estimate: 
(4) log Pij,m = αij + δt + βN ꞏ Gij ꞏ Nij + βV ꞏ Gij ꞏ Vij  
                                              + χ Nij + Σ ϕc(ci + cj) ꞏ t + Σ ψc(ci – cj) ꞏ t + eij,m   
 
14 I thank one referee for suggesting this exercise. 
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Where Nij = 1 if the team of either city i or city j makes its first appearance in the 
Champions League and 0 otherwise. Vij = 1 if both teams are “veterans,” that is: 
they already played in the Champions’ League (Nij + Vij = 1 always). The other 
variables are defined above. 
Table 3 reports the results of the exercise. On average routes connecting cities 
that had one new team are less busy (the coefficient of Nij is mostly negative). 
However, the Champions’ League group phase represents a bigger shock for these 
routes: on the month of the match traffic grows by 13.7 percent in these routes, 
compared to 5.7 percent for the other (p-value of the difference = 0.106). The 
effect is similar in January and February and becomes somewhat larger from 
March on, although none of these differences is significant.  
These results suggest two conclusions. First, the match represents a greater 
shock to routes that take part to the competition for the first time. Second, media 
exposure affects new and repeatedly exposed routes in a similar way during 
January and February, when the Champions’ League pauses. When the 
competition starts again however, there is suggestive evidence that routes across 
cities with new teams continue to benefit from the treatment, while routes across 
cities that were already in the competition before cease to enjoy greater traffic. 
Overall, the results provide suggestive evidence that the visibility effect of the 




TABLE 3 — EFFECT OF PLAYING IN THE CHAMPIONS’ LEAGUE FOR THE FIRST TIME. 









Route, Year FE 
& country trends 
Month FE 
& trends 
Month of match a 0.137*** (0.046) 0.057*** (0.017) -0.026 (0.027) 6136 Yes Yes 
          
January 0.076 (0.098) 0.085** (0.037) 0.044 (0.062) 1344 Yes No 
February 0.053 (0.082) 0.066* (0.035) -0.015 (0.058) 1346 Yes No 
March b 0.108 (0.080) 0.057* (0.032) -0.068 (0.057) 1340 Yes No 
April b 0.144* (0.079) 0.031 (0.032) -0.038 (0.059) 1358 Yes No 
May b 0.109 (0.089) 0.033 (0.033) -0.061 (0.058) 1354 Yes No 
June 0.117 (0.075) 0.021 (0.025) -0.049 (0.048) 1584 Yes No 
July 0.058 (0.074) 0.015 (0.025) -0.036 (0.053) 1584 Yes No 
August 0.102 (0.081) 0.026 (0.025) -0.068 (0.052) 1584 Yes No 
 Notes: The table reports estimates of βN, βV and χ in equation (4). The sample includes all routes across cities 
that had at least 1 team taking part in the Champions’ League group phase during the current edition. I exclude 
all routes that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw; (ii) connect cities 
in Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey or Ukraine and (iii) had their teams met in the later stages of the competition 
either in the current or in the previous edition of the Champions League. The dependent variable (log Pij,m) has 
the top and bottom 0.5 percent of observations winsorized. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
route-month-year level. See text for details.  
Source: Author calculations. 
a September through December. b Knock-out phase. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 




VI. Robustness Checks 
In this section I demonstrate the robustness of my results. 
A. Time-Varying Unobservable Characteristics 
The estimates on Table 2 have a causal interpretation if, conditional on route 
fixed effects, there are no unobservable characteristics affecting both selection 
into treatment and outcome. These unobservables would need to be time-varying: 
fixed effects take care of time-invariant confounders (cf. Smith & Todd 2005 
critique to Dehejia & Wahba 1999). Such unobservable characteristics are 
unlikely to pose a major threat to identification because of the random assignment 
of treatment. Balance of observable characteristics before treatment –including 
the changes in passengers– support this conclusion. In this section I propose an 
additional robustness test to assess the importance of time-varying unobservables. 
In Table 4 I report estimates from an augmented equation (3), where I control 
for a polynomial in time specific to both cities in a route. I estimate variants of:  
(5)            
Where f(t) and g(t) are time polynomials specific to city i and j. In Table 4-Panel 
A all regressions include linear trends. Panel B (Panel C) include a separate 2nd 
(3rd) order polynomial in time for every city. These regressions allow to control 
for factors such as city growth which may correlate positively with both arrivals 
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and the probability of treatment (through movement of a city’s team across pots, 
say). The inclusion of these controls has little effect on point estimates and 
significance, confirming the validity of the identification strategy. 
B. Robust Inference 
In this section I demonstrate the robustness of my main results to alternative 
methods of inference. Until now, I use standard errors clustered at route-month-
year level. This corrects for the most important source of bias in the formula for 
robust standard errors: the perfect correlation of treatment within routes (Gij,t = 
Gji,t always) combined with the positive correlation of errors on the two ways of a 
route: E(eij,t,eji,t) > 0. This correction may still fail to control for some of the 
correlation across units, and in this section I present exercises that demonstrate 
the resulting potential bias is small and does invalidate any of my conclusions. 
To understand the nature of the problem, consider the formula for clustered 
standard errors (adapted from equation (2) in Cameron and Miller, 2015): 
 
Where 1[∙] is an indicator variable for route ij and route kl being in the same 
cluster, sums are over all possible routes, time subscripts are omitted for 




TABLE 4 — ROBUSTNESS TO CITY-SPECIFIC TIME TRENDS. 
PANEL A – City-specific linear trends
 β s.e. Obs. Route FE
Year FE & city 
linear trends
Month FE & 
month trends 
Month of the matcha 0.058*** (0.016) 6136 Yes Yes Yes 
   
January 0.085** (0.035) 1344 Yes Yes No 
February 0.063** (0.031) 1346 Yes Yes No 
March b 0.061** (0.028) 1340 Yes Yes No 
April b 0.048* (0.029) 1358 Yes Yes No 
May b 0.040 (0.029) 1354 Yes Yes No 
June 0.026 (0.022) 1584 Yes Yes No 
July 0.013 (0.024) 1584 Yes Yes No 
August 0.028 (0.023) 1584 Yes Yes No 
 
PANEL B – City-specific quadratic trends
 β s.e. Obs. Route FE
Year FE & city 
quadratic trends
Month FE & 
month trends 
Month of the matcha 0.055*** (0.015) 6136 Yes Yes Yes 
    
January 0.080** (0.036) 1344 Yes Yes No 
February 0.062** (0.032) 1346 Yes Yes No 
March b 0.057** (0.027) 1340 Yes Yes No 
April b 0.044 (0.028) 1358 Yes Yes No 
May b 0.030 (0.026) 1354 Yes Yes No 
June 0.014 (0.021) 1584 Yes Yes No 
July -0.009 (0.021) 1584 Yes Yes No 
August 0.011 (0.020) 1584 Yes Yes No 
 
PANEL C– City-specific cubit trends
 β s.e. Obs. Route FE
Year FE & city 
cubic trends
Month FE & 
month trends 
Month of the matcha 0.059*** (0.015) 6136 Yes Yes Yes 
   
January 0.069** (0.033) 1344 Yes Yes No 
February 0.063** (0.031) 1346 Yes Yes No 
March b 0.057** (0.028) 1340 Yes Yes No 
April b 0.047* (0.028) 1358 Yes Yes No 
May b 0.023 (0.026) 1354 Yes Yes No 
June 0.002 (0.021) 1584 Yes Yes No 
July -0.019 (0.021) 1584 Yes Yes No 
August -0.003 (0.020) 1584 Yes Yes No 
Notes: The table reports estimates of β in equation (4). The sample includes all routes across cities that had at 
least 1 team taking part in the Champions League group phase during the current edition. I exclude all routes 
that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw; (ii) connect cities in Israel, 
Russia, Serbia, Turkey or Ukraine and (iii) had their teams met in the later stages of the competition in the 
current or previous edition of the Champions League. Regressions in Panel A control for city-specific linear 
trends. Regressions in Panel B control for city-specific quadratic trends. Regressions in Panel C control for city-
specific cubic trends. The dependent variable has the top and bottom 0.5 percent of observations winsorized. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the route-month-year level. 
a September through December. b Knock-out phase. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
37 
 
Given the (unknown) true definition of clusters, the bias of incorrect clustering 
depends on the characteristics of clusters excluded from the calculation. In other 
words, given the correct set of indicators 1[∙], the bias of incorrect clustering is a 
function of the relationship between observations for which 1[∙] was erroneously 
set to 0. Three factors determine the bias of the standard errors: (1) the correlation 
of treatment across these units, (2) the correlation of errors across these units and 
(3) the size of the excluded clusters: that is, the number of indicator variables 
erroneously set to 0.  
In what follows, I compare baseline standard errors to three alternative 
definitions of clusters: the first considers potential bias coming from the first 
factor and the other two from the second factor. Baseline standard errors are 
clustered at route-month-year level. This assumes that only routes connecting the 
same cities in the same month-year belong in the same clusters. In the present 
setting this correction is important because both Gij,t and eij,t are likely to be 
correlated within these clusters. The second column of Table 5 reproduces these 
standard errors for reference.  
Next, I consider potential bias coming from the correlation of treatment across 
routes: Gij,t. Column 3 of Table 5 shows standard errors clustered at the group-
year level. This takes into account that routes across cities in the same group have 
correlated Gij,t (for any three cities i, j and k with a team in the same group Gij,t = 
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Gik,t = Gjk,t). The correction has small effect on standard errors and negligible on 
significance, possibly because errors across these units have low correlation. 
The second and third corrections account for possible correlation of errors eij,t. 
Column 4 of Table 5 shows standard errors clustered at route level. This allows 
errors on a given route to be correlated on the two direction of the route and 
overtime. The correction has a modest effect on size of standard errors and 
significance, possibly because even though errors are serially correlated, the 
treatment is not.15 
Column 5 of Table 5 presents dyadic standard errors (Fafchamps and Guber 
2007a and 2007b). The correction allows errors across any two routes to be 
correlated whenever they share at least one city. In other words, 1[ij and kl in 
same cluster] = 1 whenever i = k or i = l or j = k or j = l. This effectively accounts 
for correlation coming from city-level shocks (as opposed to route-level shocks). 
These standard errors are if anything larger than the baseline, suggesting that city-
level shocks do not invalidate inference, possibly because the treatment is 






15 The coefficient of a regression of treatment status on its lag on yearly data gives a coefficient of 0.01, p-value = 0.75. 
39 
 
TABLE 5 — ROBUSTNESS FOR THE EFFECT OF PLAYING IN THE SAME GROUP OF THE CHAMPIONS LEAGUE. 
  Standard errors    
 




route Dyadic Obs. 
Route & 






Month of the 
matcha  0.067 (0.016)*** (0.020)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** 6136 Yes Yes 
      
January  0.084 (0.035)** (0.039)** (0.039)** (0.031)*** 1344 Yes No 
February  0.064 (0.032)** (0.030)** (0.037)* (0.029)** 1346 Yes No 
March b  0.062 (0.028)** (0.030)** (0.031)** (0.025)** 1340 Yes No 
April b  0.045 (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) 1358 Yes No 
May b  0.042 (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) 1354 Yes No 
June  0.030 (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) 1584 Yes No 
July  0.033 (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) 1584 Yes No 
August  0.019 (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) 1584 Yes No 
 Notes: The table reports estimates of β in equation (3). The sample includes all routes across cities that had at 
least 1 team taking part in the Champions League group phase during the current edition. I exclude all routes 
that: (i) could not have been treated given the seeding structure of the random draw; (ii) connect cities in Israel, 
Russia, Serbia, Turkey or Ukraine and (iii) had their teams met in the later stages of the competition either in 
the current or in the previous edition of the Champions League. The dependent variable has the top and bottom 
0.5 percent of observations winsorized. See text for details.  
Source: Author calculations. 
a September through December. b Knock-out phase. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Until now, all inference relies on asymptotically correct covariance matrices. In 
one last exercise I follow Young (2019) and exploit the known structure of the 
Champions’ League random draw to perform randomized inference. This 
approach has the advantage to produce exact tests irrespective of sample size and 
errors covariances. In this exercise, I take the set of all routes across cities that 
had at least one team playing in the Champions’ League group phase between 
1998 and 2010, and randomly create groups of four teams following the same 
rules UEFA applies to create its groups. Every year, each one of my groups is 
made of exactly one team randomly drawn from each of the four pots. I also make 
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sure that no two teams from the same football federation ever end up in the same 
group.  
TABLE 6 — RESULTS FROM 1000 PLACEBO SIMULATIONS OF THE TREATMENT. 
 Simulations with  
p-value smaller than  0.05 
95th percentile of  
estimates in simulations 
True β
Simulations larger 
than  true β a 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Month of the match b 8.6 % 0.038 0.067 0.1% 
     
January 5.2 % 0.068 0.084 1.5% 
February 6.2 % 0.067 0.064 5.7% 
March c 6.3 % 0.061 0.062 4.6% 
April c 6.2 % 0.051 0.045 6.9% 
May c 5.5 % 0.048 0.042 8.4% 
June 4.9 % 0.039 0.030 10.3% 
July 4.1 % 0.037 0.033 6.7% 
August 4.4 % 0.039 0.019 22.5% 
 Notes: Column (1) reports the percentage of simulations in which the effect of a placebo treatment was estimated to be 
different from 0 at the 5 percent confidence level. Placebo treatments are defined according to the same rules used to form the 
Champions League groups. I run 1000 simulations: every time I estimate equation (3) substituting the true treatment Gij with 
this placebo treatment. Column (2) reports the 95th percentile of the simulated β. Column (3) reports the true β from table 2. 
Column (4) reports the percentage of simulations with an estimated β larger than the one reported in column 2.  
Source: Author calculations. 
 a From table 2. b September through December. c Knock-out phase. 
 
I draw 1000 such placebo treatments and for each draw I estimate regression (3) 
with standard errors clustered at route-year level and store the p-value of the 
coefficient β. The first column of Table 6 shows for each months in which 
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regression (3) is estimated, the percentage of simulations that had a p-value 
smaller than 0.05. The results suggest that with route-year clustering the error 
structure biases standard errors slightly downward. However, the last column in 
Table 6 also suggests that estimated treatment effects remain significant even with 
randomized inference: if anything, the effect in later months approaches 
conventional levels of significance. One reason why results from exact tests from 
randomized inference may be similar to tests based on asymptotic distributions is 
because the number of clusters used for calculation is large.16 
Taken together, the exercises in this section confirm the robustness of the 
results to alternative methods of inference. 
VII. Summary 
Do professional teams make their hometowns more visible among tourists? 
Using a natural experiment embedded in the European Champions’ League 
competition, I show that cities hosting teams receive more visitors from cities 
where Champions League games are more salient. My findings provide the first 
causal evidence that teams have the potential to increase the visibility of their 
hometowns. To the extent that my results carry over to the US, they may help 
explain Carlino and Coulson’s (2004) finding that house rents are significantly 
 
16 In the regressions in January, with route-level clustering there are 287 clusters; with group-year clustering 425 and with 
route-month-year clustering 672. 
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higher in U.S. cities with NFL franchises. The greater visibility of these cities 
may increase the flow of visitors, which would bring direct advantages for retail 
business and hotels for example, and ultimately should increase rents.  
In any case, it is important to stress that the visibility effect I find appears to 
have diminishing returns and require continuous media exposure. The first 
appearance of a team on the competition represents a larger shock to air travel 
than subsequent participations, suggesting diminishing returns. Moreover, the 
effect of playing in the same group of the Champions League disappears soon 
after teams stop playing against each other. This implies that the visibility effects 
depend on the structure of the competitions. For example, teams that play more 
games per season may be more valuable for the visibility of a city. 
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Appendix A. Data description 
I source air traffic data from Eurostat’s “Detailed air passenger transport by 
reporting country and routes” tables17. For every airport in each European 
country, this database contains information on monthly air travel on every route 
from 1998 to 2010. On every route both arrivals and departures are available. 
Moreover, two different variables are available both for arrivals and for 
departures: total number of passengers carried and total number of passengers 
onboard. Passengers onboard equals passengers carried plus passengers that stop 
over and proceed to a different destination on the same aircraft, but in practice the 
two measures are almost identical (between January and August the correlation is 
0.9994, p-value < 0.0001). Since for some countries only one between passengers 
carried and passengers onboard is reported, I pool all available information as 
follows. There are 4 measures of number of arrivals on each direction of a route: 
passengers carried and passengers onboard recorded as arrivals in the airport of 
destination, and passengers carried and passengers onboard recorded as departure 
in the airport of origin. The dependent variable used in the paper is the simple 
average of all measures available on every direction of a route. In the regressions 
shown in table 2, 67.9 percent of routes have all 4 measures available between 
January and August. Using information from the other end of a route cleans some 
 
17 Data are available online at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/database. 
44 
 
of the noise present at the end of every month, when some passengers are 
recorded as flying on one month in one airport and on the following one at the 
other end18. In all regressions I use the natural logarithm of the dependent variable 
so defined, and I winsorize the top and bottom 0.005 percent of observations to 
avoid extreme values to drive results.  
Both tourism data (night spent in every NUTS 2 region) and demographic and 
economic data for European cities come from Eurostat19. Data on rail, maritime 
and road travel across and within European countries also come from Eurostat, 
and refer only to the countries used in the regressions20. Data on geographic 
coordinates of every European city used to compute distances come from 
Wikipedia. I hand-collected every match of the UEFA Champions League from 
the 1997-98 to the 2010-11 edition from the UEFA official website21. 
Appendix B. Dyadic Regression 
This appendix is based on Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a and 2007b): refer to 
these papers for details. Both air traffic (log Pij,m) and the Champions League 
treatment (Gij) are observed on networks in which observations are city-pairs, and 
 
18 Although also arrivals from j to i are very correlated with departures from j to i (0.9942, p-value < 0.0001) every 
month during which the former are greater than the latter are followed by a month in which the opposite happens, by 
exactly the same number of passengers. 
19 Tourism data is available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/tourism/data/database; data on cities 
at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/city_urban/data_cities/database_sub1. 
20 All available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/database. 
21 Online at: http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/. 
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every city appears on several different pairs. Regression analysis on network data 
requires to specify a dyadic model, and both identification and inference need to 
be adjusted: I discuss these issues in turn. 
Identification.—A simpler version of the dyadic regression analyzed in the text 
takes the form: 
(B1) , 
where time subscripts are omitted for simplicity. In (B1) the treatment Gij is 
specific to the route across city i and city j: in this case identification does not 
require any correction. When characteristics specific to the two cities enter a 
dyadic regression however, it is important that they affect both ways of the route 
symmetrically: this means that the effect of city characteristic c on air travel must 
be such that the effect of ci and cj on log Pij is the same as the effect of cj and ci on 
log Pji. In order to impose this symmetry, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a and 
2007b) propose two different solutions, depending on whether the dyadic 
relationship is directional (as with air traffic, for which log Pij ≠ log Pji) or un-
directional (as the average arrivals across a route log Avg Pij = log Avg Pji). When 




When the dyadic relationship is un-directional, symmetry is satisfied with: 
(B3) , 
Regressions (2) and (3) are directional dyadic regressions (since arrivals from j 
to i in month m need not be equal to arrivals from i to j during the same period): 
in these regressions country-trends must enter the equation as in (B2). The 
dependent variables in the regressions on data collapsed at the route-month level 
and the treatment Gij define un-directional relationships (log Avg Pij = log Avg Pji 
and Gij = Gji). For this reason country dummies enter regressions on collapsed 
data as in (B3), and for every city-specific variable for which I test the equality of 
means in table 1 I do so both for the sum and for the absolute difference across 
the two cities on a route. 
Inference.— Standard errors in model (B1) need to take into account that shocks 
affecting city i will have an impact on all routes connecting i, and that this is true 
for all cities on all routes. This implies that in general E(eij,ekl) ≠ 0 whenever i = k 
or i = l or j = k or j = l, and that the structure of the errors in regression (B1) has a 
form similar to that of a regression with clusters. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a 
and 2007b) propose to correct the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients in a 
dyadic regression with a formula similar to the one proposed by Conley (1999) 
for spatially correlated errors: 
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(B4)  , 
 
where  is the K×1 vector of estimated coefficient, N is the number of 
observations X is the matrix of all regressors, eij is the error in equation (B1) and 
mijkl = 1 if either i = k or i = l or j = k or j = l. 
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007a and 2007b) estimate (B4) on complete networks, 
i.e. networks in which every node is connected to every other node in the 
network. However, the air traffic network analyzed here is not complete: first, not 
every city has a direct connection to every other city taking part in the Champions 
League (there might exist both a Rome-Lille and a Rome-Valencia route, but no 
Lille-Valencia connection). Second, even if all routes existed, some routes are not 
valid “controls” for my treated routes, because cities that had teams in the same 
pot could not meet, and teams from the same country can not end up in the same 
group. In order to estimate (B4) on an incomplete network I coded a new option 
in the Stata program provided by Fafchamps: this is available on my website.22 
 
22 Here: https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0B2ZiMgcf6J3wR2hqSzQwXzk4YTg. 
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Appendix C. The UEFA Champions League 
The first edition of the UEFA Champions League was held in 1955-56. Since 
then the number of participating teams and the general format of the competition 
have both changed many times. The group phase was introduced in the 1991-92 
edition, and since 1994-95 all the matches in the group phase have been played 
between September and the first week of December. The number of groups has 
grown overtime, but these have always been formed randomly. Since the 1999-
2000 edition there have always been 8 groups.  
The rules to admit teams to the group phase vary by country and by year. 
“Major” leagues send the first 2 or 3 teams of the previous season directly to the 
group stage. Teams that ended first and second in one of the “minor” leagues, and 
teams that ended third or fourth in one of the major leagues take part to a 
“preliminary phase”. Official country rankings determine the number of teams 
that every country can send to the group phase or to the preliminary phase. These 
rankings are updated by UEFA every season according to 5-year moving average 
of the performance of national teams in all European competitions. The 
preliminary phase, played between July and August, consist of a series of knock-
out matches that selects 10 of the 32 teams participating in the group phase. These 
games are not very popular and, since UEFA does not manage directly the TV 
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rights for these games, they are only occasionally broadcasted, even in interested 
countries (European Commission, 2003).  
Note that the format of the competition implies that both the year and the 
countries of team pairs might be correlated with the treatment. Year matters 
because the rules to qualify changed overtime (most notably in 1999, when the 
number of participating teams became 32, and in 2009, when the rules to access 
the group phase were renewed). These changes might have affected the 
probability of any 2 particular teams to meet, even conditional on reaching the 
group stage. Country specific trends are important because the number of 
participating teams from any country, and the pots where these teams are seeded 
depend on national UEFA coefficients, which in turn are updated every year, 
according to the current and past performance of national teams in UEFA 
competitions. Country rankings have evolved very differently over the last 
decade, often trailing domestic economic growth. For this reason, they might 
correlate with both the probability of treatment and the evolution of air traffic. In 
order to control for this confounders I include in every specification a set of 
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